Many studies have been made to obtain a monetary valuation of reduced risk of death, usually given as the value of a statistical life (VSL), which is a reduction in risk corresponding to the prevention of one fatality. This paper asks whether valuation research provides a credible basis for cost-benefit analysis of safety measures. A costbenefit analysis is credible if its results cannot be criticised by reference to the valuation studies forming its basis. It is argued that a credible basis for cost-benefit 
INTRODUCTION
Modern research on the valuation of safety, in particular reduced risk of accidental death, started around 1970. At that time, two widely quoted papers by Schelling (1968) and Mishan (1971) formulated the theoretical foundations for empirical research designed to obtain a monetary valuation of changes in the risk of death.
Both papers argued that the only meaningful approach to the monetary valuation of changes in mortality risk is the willingness-to-pay approach. This point of view is virtually unanimously accepted by economists working in the field.
Several studies of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for changes, most often reductions, in mortality risk have been made. In most studies, risk is stated as the annual number of deaths from a specific cause per 100,000 inhabitants of a country. Willingness-to-pay is usually stated as the value of a change in risk that statistically corresponds to the prevention of one death, often referred to as the value of a statistical life (VSL) or the value of preventing a fatality. A recent meta-analysis of stated preference studies (Lindhjem et al. 2011) included 856 estimates of the value of a statistical life. These varied (in 2005 US dollars) between 4,450 and 197,000,000 -a factor of 44,000.
There is, in other words, an enormous variation in estimates of the value of a statistical life. This, by itself, would not necessarily be a problem if a good explanation of the diversity of values could be given and, based on such an explanation, the best value selected for a given application. One would then define a context in terms of, for example, initial risk level, size of change in risk, mean income, etc. and select the most appropriate value of a statistical life for that context. Unfortunately, the procedure sketched above is unlikely to work. The chief reason for that is that recent developments in the theory of willingness-to-pay have made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between results of valuation studies that make sense from a theoretical point of view and results that do not make sense from a theoretical point of view. These theoretical developments have profound implications for the interpretation of diversity in estimates of the value of a statistical life and for analyses designed to identify theoretically meaningful patters of variation in estimates of the value of a statistical life. This paper argues that by trying to make sense of the wide diversity of values of a statistical life by developing new theoretical models, theorists have, perhaps unintentionally, undermined the basis for choosing the best-founded value of a statistical life in a particular context.
THEORETICAL MODELS OF VARIATION IN THE VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE
The papers by Schelling (1968) and Mishan (1971) were quite general and did not put forward specific hypotheses about willingness-to-pay for changes in mortality risk. It did not take long, however, before more specific theoretical propositions were I:\SM-AVD\3398 Kjerne 21\Artikkelarkiv 2013-\Elvik_10.1504_IJBCRM.2017.088806.docx 5 developed. An early paper contributing to the development of theory was written by Jones-Lee (1974) . Jones-Lee (1974) proposed hypotheses about how an individual would value changes in mortality risk, based on the following assumptions:
1. The individual maximises expected utility (which is a probability-weighted utility of a lottery with life and death as potential outcomes).
2. The individual prefers more wealth to less and is financially risk averse (prefers an income received with certainty to an uncertain income).
3. The individual does not want descendants to be exposed to a greater financial risk than himself or herself. 4. At a given level of wealth, the individual prefers to be alive rather than dead.
5. The marginal utility of wealth is greater when the individual is alive than when the individual is dead.
Based on these assumptions, Jones-Lee could deduce that a positive willingness-topay for reduced risk of death will exist. He further deduced that willingness-to-pay will be positively related to income and positively related to the level of risk. This example shows how one can use theoretical predictions to assess whether empirical results make sense or not. If you find that willingness-to-pay varies systematically as predicted by theory, results make sense. This example shows the essential function of theory in willingness-to-pay research: It is to predict a systematic pattern of variation in willingness-to-pay that may serve as reference in assessing whether the results of empirical studies make sense or not.
It did not take long, however, before more complex models were developed and predictions became ambiguous. The extremely complex model proposed by Dehez and Drèze (1982) is an example. Here are the predictions of this model:
1. If an individual does not have life insurance or an annuity, and if the marginal utility of money is greater when alive than when dead, willingness to pay will increase when risk level increases.
2. If the individual has optimal life insurance and annuity at actuarially fair rates, willingness to pay is independent of the level of risk.
3. If the individual holds life insurance and annuity at less than actuarially fair rates, willingness to pay will increase as the level of risk goes down.
4. If the individual holds life insurance and annuity at more than actuarially fair rates, willingness to pay will increase as risk level increases.
5. If the individual has life insurance and annuity and the terms of the contracts are adjusted as risk level changes, willingness to pay will increase as risk level decreases.
One could say that they hedge their bets. Everything is possible; that willingness to pay does not depend on risk level, that it increases with risk level, or that it decreases with risk level. None of these findings is ruled out theoretically. No matter what you find, it has theoretical support -unless you can collect detailed data on the insurance coverage of respondents. But even if such data are available, it may be difficult to determine if insurance is actuarially fair or not.
As time went by, theorists expanded the range of topics they addressed. By now, the following topics have been discussed in theoretical contributions: For many of these topics, alternative theoretical models have been developed. This means that when all theoretical models are viewed as a whole, few results of valuation studies can be ruled out on theoretical grounds. In other words: The theory of willingness to pay for changes in risk contains so many contradictory hypotheses that it can no longer be falsified and serve the essential function of distinguishing results that make sense from results that do not. Table 1 summarises the current state of affairs.
Table 1 about here
Consider, for example, the size of the change in risk. For a long time, the theoretical prediction was that willingness to pay would vary in proportion, or near proportion to the size of the change in risk. Many empirical studies did not find this, a phenomenon that was referred to as insensitivity to scope. Efforts were made to better explain changes in risk in order to make respondents more sensitive to the size of these changes. These efforts had moderate success. But then in 2003 and, more extensively, in 2010 Hagen (2003, 2010 ) proposed a new model, directionally bounded utility functions, that predicted insensitivity to scope. They argued that conventional utility functions imply a property they call hypersubstitutability, which means that there are no limits to how much an individual will give up of a specific good in order to obtain another good. They argue that Their contribution is typical of many recent contributions to theory about the willingness to pay for changes in mortality risk. The predictions of the theoretical models are typically qualitative only; they predict the direction of an effect, but not its strength. Interpretation thus becomes difficult when hypotheses make contradictory predictions. If empirical findings are in a region of doubt, i.e. they can be consistent with more than one underlying utility model, attempting to ascertain which utility model best explains the results is likely to be inconclusive. This means that few results can be ruled out on theoretical grounds. Theory gives little guidance in the selection of the theoretically best-supported estimates of the value of a statistical life.
REFORMULATIONS OF THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
When modern research on the monetary valuation of changes in mortality risk started, an important element of the justification for it was that it was only by applying a single, uniform value of a statistical life that efficient priorities could be set. Hills and Jones-Lee (1983) put this argument in very clear terms and illustrated it by numerical examples. There is little doubt that the initial objective of empirical studies was to find a good estimate of the value of a statistical life that could be applied uniformly to all problems involving expenditures on safety programmes.
It did not take long, however, before the great diversity in estimates of the value of a statistical life cast doubt on the prospects of finding a single value that could be applied uniformly. Nevertheless, as explained above, if the variation in values could be explained theoretically, it might still be possible, guided by theory, to select the best-supported value of a statistical life. Today, this is impossible. Even findings reflecting insensitivity to scope are held, by some at least, to make sense from a theoretical point of view.
Some recent contributions that discuss the valuation of changes in risk from a prescriptive point of view have moved away from the traditional emphasis on using a uniform value to maximise efficiency. In two papers, Baker et al. (2008 Baker et al. ( , 2009 discussed whether the widespread practice of using a uniform value of a statistical life, i.e. the arithmetic mean of willingness-to-pay (WTP) in a population, is consistent with the theoretical foundations of cost-benefit analysis, and, if not, if an acceptable normative foundation can be defined for applying a single value of a statistical life (VSL). They note that (2009:814, 815 In short, the principles of cost-benefit analysis, as presented here by Baker et al. imply that VSL should vary according to the variation in WTP between different groups in society. A uniform value is inconsistent with cost-benefit analysis. Viscusi 
A RANGE OF VALUES BASED ON META-ANALYSIS
One option is to estimate a range of values based on meta-analysis. There have been many meta-analyses of the literature about the value of a statistical life; for a summary see Elvik (2016A) . The most comprehensive of these analyses, in terms of the number of estimates of VSL included and the depth of statistical analysis, is the one reported by Lindhjem et al. (2011 Lindhjem et al. ( , 2012 . It may perhaps strike readers as counterintuitive that the value of a statistical life declines as a function of the size of the change in risk. Thus, when reduction in risk is a private good, the value of a statistical life at a risk reduction of 15 per million is only about half the value at a risk reduction of 5 per million. Hence, all else equal, a small risk reduction seems to be more attractive than a large risk reduction. This, however, is a result of insensitivity to scope. It is easy to calculate backwards and find the mean willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the stated changes in risk. Thus, at an income of 60,000, one finds that mean WTP increases from 200 for a risk reduction of 5 per million, to 268 for a risk reduction of 10 per million and 318 for a risk reduction of 15 per million. In other words, individuals prefer the largest risk reduction, for which the value of a statistical life is lowest. This is the consequence of accepting insensitivity to scope as an expression of rational trade-offs made by individuals.
There is perhaps no alternative to doing so. Were one to reject studies showing insensitivity to scope, virtually all valuation studies would have to be rejected.
Acceptance of insensitivity to scope does, however, lead to a preference reversal when mean individual willingness to pay is aggregated to the value of a statistical life.
In practice, no government would use a range of values like those given in Table 2 in cost-benefit analysis. A single value would be selected and used for all projects. Yet all values presented in Table 8 are equally well justified. Choice of a specific value could therefore be based on strategic considerations. One could, for example, argue that incomes are growing, that improvements in safety will come in the form of safer cars (an individual good), and that we can at present only estimate the effects of road safety measures (including safer cars) that would reduce risk by 5 per million to justify a choice of the highest value. Equally plausible considerations might lead to the choice of a lower value.
DISCUSSION
Cost-benefit analyses are controversial for many reasons, but one of them is that not everybody trusts the monetary valuations of non-market goods used in cost-benefit analyses. Indeed, as far as the valuation of human life is concerned, the values are, as one critic (Hauer 2011 ) puts it "all over the place". It is impossible to disagree with this description, given the fact that a comprehensive meta-analysis (Lindhjem et al. 2011 ) included values of a statistical life (in 2005 US dollars) ranging from 4,450 to 197,000,000. Many would say that this fact alone discredits any cost-benefit analysis based on any value of human life within the huge range of such values found in the literature.
Yet, proponents of cost-benefit analysis might argue that not all values in the huge range are to be trusted. Some of these values must be rejected and the remaining lie within a narrower range. This is correct, but even if the presumably "best" values are selected, the range remains huge (Lindhjem et al. 2012) . Even within a single study, based on state-of-the-art methods, the range of values is enormous. Thus, based on a Norwegian valuation study (Veisten et al. 2010 (Veisten et al. , 2013 , Veisten (2016) extracted 66 estimates of the value of a statistical life ranging from 15.8 to 362.7 million NOK.
Which of these estimates is the best one? It is difficult to select a single one of the 66 estimates as clearly superior to the others. However, it is plausible to argue that some of the estimates are more credible, i.e. more trustworthy, than the others in the sense that they are less likely to be influenced by methodological weaknesses or answers that are inconsistent with economic theory. A subset of 22 estimates was defined, by excluding those who answered lexicographically in stated choice experiments (to answer lexicographically is to always prefer the alternative that is best with respect to a specific attribute, for example safety, regardless of the values of other attributes) and including only respondents who indicated that they were certain about their answers (using a certainty scale).
The range of values of a statistical life in the subset of 22 estimates was from 15.8 to 151.5 million NOK. This still leaves considerable room for choice. A weighted mean, estimated by means of meta-analysis, was 30.3 million NOK according to a fixedeffects model and 52.8 million NOK according to a random-effects model.
According to the rules of the game for meta-analysis (Elvik 2016B) , one would normally prefer the random-effects estimate. The data show, however, that there is a positive relationship between the estimate of the value of a statistical life and its standard error, which means that higher estimates of the value of a statistical life contribute proportionately more to the random-effects statistical weights than to the fixed-effects statistical weights, thereby pulling the weighted mean estimate upwards.
If one accounts for this relationship by means of the precision-regression method proposed by Doucouliagos (2013, 2014) 
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions of the discussion presented in this paper are:
1. Estimates of the value of preventing a fatality, the value of a statistical life, vary enormously.
2. Over time, there has been a tendency towards reformulating the theory of willingness to pay for non-market goods so that findings that were initially regarded as anomalous, i.e. inconsistent with theory, are no longer regarded as so. This means that the great diversity of estimates of the value of a statistical life is no longer regarded as inconsistent with economic theory.
3. This development has broadened the range of values of a statistical life that are regarded as theoretically plausible. However, theory cannot specify how wide the theoretically plausible range of values is, as its predictions are qualitative only (e.g. it predicts insensitivity to scope, but not how strong the insensitivity will be). Hypotheses about variation in willingness to pay for changes in mortality risk and the possibility of falsifying the hypotheses Table 2: A selection of values of a statistical life estimates from Lindhjem et al. 2011 Background risks A competing mortality risk may decrease willingness-to-pay for a target risk or have no effect on it A background financial may both decrease and increase willingness-topay for a target risk Partly, if a competing risk is found to increase willingness-to-pay for the target risk that would be inconsistent with theory
No; while the conditions for a decrease or increase in willingness-to-pay are different, they are in practice unobservable 
